Mental Health Sentencing Update

As a criminal practitioner specialising in clients with serious mental illness, acquired brain injury, and neurodevelopmental disorders, Mark Pritchard has been closely following Court of Appeal rulings in this area. Three recent decisions restate key principles in some of the most contentious areas of criminal practice.
Hospital Order With, or Without Restriction?

A hospital order is a sentence requiring a defendant to receive treatment for a mental disorder. Typically, the individual is admitted to a mental health unit, treated, and discharged into the community once sufficiently well. At that point, the order comes to an end.

However, some patients function better in a structured hospital setting and may pose a risk if discharged too soon or without safeguards.

To address this, the court can impose a hospital order with restrictions (under section 41 of the Mental Health Act 1983). In such cases, the Secretary of State for Justice must approve key decisions, including leave, transfer, or discharge.

On discharge, the Secretary of State may grant:

  • Absolute discharge: the order ends entirely; or
  • Conditional discharge (more common): the patient remains subject to conditions, usually including compliance with treatment in the community.

If those conditions are breached or risk increases, the patient can be recalled to hospital. The conditions remain in place until the Secretary of State, or Mental Health Review Tribunal discharge them. It is not uncommon for patients to remain under such conditions for decades being recalled to hospital regularly.

The recent case of Gordon involved an appeal against the imposition of a restriction order.

In April 2023, the 50-year-old Mr Gordon was living with his parents. On 18 April, his mother found him shaking and holding a kitchen knife, repeatedly saying, “What have you done to me?” and “I can’t let go.” Fearing he would stab her, she restrained him until he eventually stopped and told her to stay in another room. From there, she heard him pacing and talking to himself.

Shortly afterwards, she heard noises upstairs. The appellant then returned and told her he had stabbed his father and thought he was dead. She followed him upstairs and found her husband seriously injured, lying in a pool of blood.

The father had no memory of the attack. He suffered severe blood loss, went into cardiac arrest, and required resuscitation. He sustained four stab wounds to the leg, severing a major artery and vein. His injuries were life-threatening, requiring emergency surgery, intensive care, and further treatment. An MRI later revealed a small stroke, and he was transferred to a specialist ward.

Mr Gordon pleaded guilty to one offence of unlawful wounding, contrary to section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. He was sentenced to a hospital order with a restriction order.

In Gordon’s case, three expert reports were obtained and all three experts agreed that a restriction order was not necessary. One of the doctors also gave oral evidence supporting that view, although he accepted that Mr Gordon did present some risk if released into the community.

The Court of Appeal emphasised that the decision whether to impose a restriction order ultimately rests with the judge. In this case, the judge was satisfied that such an order was necessary, having regard to the nature of the offence and the risk of further offending if the appellant were released. He concluded that a section 37 hospital order alone did not provide sufficient protection for the public, and that it was therefore necessary to impose a restriction order under section 41.

Key cases relied upon were

  • R v Birch (1990) 90 Cr.App.R 78 which states risk of the assessment of serious harm was that of the court which was not bound to follow the advice of the medical witnesses.
  • R v Royse (1981) 3 Cr.App.R (S) 58 the question for a restriction is a matter for the judge. Any successful appeal would need to show that the judge was either irrational or Wednesbury
Key Points
  • Before making a hospital order the court must court be satisfied, on the written or oral evidence of two registered medical practitioners, that the offender is suffering from mental disorder.
  • That mental disorder must
    • Be of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate for him to be detained in a hospital for medical treatment,
    • and appropriate medical treatment is available for him.
  • The sentencing judge must have due regard to the expert evidence but is not bound by it.

 

Hybrid order vs Hospital Order

The “hybrid order” under section 45A of the Mental Health Act 1983 is a controversial disposal, intended to bridge the long-standing gap between punishment and treatment in serious cases involving mental disorder. When such an order is imposed, the defendant receives a custodial sentence but is immediately transferred to hospital for treatment. Once treatment is no longer required, they are returned to prison to serve the remainder of their sentence.

In Turner, the court considered whether a hybrid order or a more traditional hospital order was appropriate.

On 23 December 2022, Mr Turner left his home in Westcliff-on-Sea armed with two knives and a loaded crossbow. When challenged in the street, he calmly confirmed he was carrying a crossbow. He then entered the Lion & Lamb pub and, within minutes, aimed the crossbow at a 51-year-old regular, David Peck, and shot him in the chest. Mr Peck collapsed and was pronounced dead at the scene. Mr Turner later called the police and falsely claimed he had accidentally shot a neighbour.

At the time of the killing, Turner was acutely psychotic and suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, having failed to comply with his medication. He pleaded guilty to manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility and to two counts of possessing a bladed article.

The sentencing judge nevertheless concluded that Turner had formed the specific intent to kill. This was evidenced by his deliberate arming, the controlled manner of the offence, and his subsequent attempts to conceal responsibility by lying to the police and disabling the weapon. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a hybrid hospital order under section 45A, with a minimum term of eight years.

All experts agreed that the criteria for a hospital order under section 37 were met, and that a restriction order under section 41 was also justified. They further agreed that, but for his mental illness, the offence would not have occurred, and described his culpability as low due to the strong link between the killing and his psychotic disorder.

The Crown relied on the degree of planning, the use of multiple weapons, and the manner of the attack. The defence argued for lower culpability based on the psychiatric evidence. The judge rejected that submission, finding the case to be one of medium culpability. In her sentencing remarks, she was satisfied that, despite his condition, Turner was capable of—and did—form the intent to kill.

The Court of Appeal, relying on Vowles, held that sentencing guidelines require consideration of a hybrid order before imposing a traditional hospital order, as section 45A introduces a penal element. Accordingly, there must be “sound reasons” to depart from a disposal that includes punishment. The more serious the offence and the greater the risk to the public, the greater the weight to be given to public protection and the release regime. The court concluded that the judge had properly considered the psychiatric evidence and was entitled to find that recall provisions and public protection were better served by a hybrid order.

Key Points
  • The Court must follow the step-by-step approach in the guideline before passing a hospital order.
    • Is a penal sentence appropriate?
    • Is a penal sentence following a period receiving treatment in hospital appropriate (a hybrid order)?
    • Is a hospital order appropriate?
    • Is a hospital order with restrictions appropriate?
Fresh Evidence in Mental Health Cases and Disposal When Unfit to Stand Trial

In Wood, the Court of Appeal considered an appeal against conviction and sentence for arson (2019). Before trial, the defence repeatedly warned that Mr Wood was unfit to instruct or participate and requested an intermediary. The court ordered a psychiatric assessment by Dr Hayes, who had assessed him previously in (in 2004 and 2011).

Crucially, Dr Hayes was not given up-to-date medical records and was unaware of a severe brain injury in 2015, as well as alcohol-related brain damage. He therefore concluded—incorrectly—that Mr Wood had no significant cognitive impairment affecting his fitness to stand trial, though he suggested an intermediary might assist communication. It is unclear to what extend Dr Hayes relied upon his previous findings to inform his opinion in this case.

No ground rules hearing was held. The defence statement indicated that Mr Wood did not understand key warnings and that meaningful instructions could not be obtained.

Concerns persisted during trial. On day one, a juror raised doubts about Mr Wood’s mental capacity based on his behaviour in the dock in a note which read;

“Sir, I hope you do not find this premature or critical, but I have immediate concerns over the mental capacity of the defendant based on his appearance, manner, behaviour in the dock. Is the legal system or the mental health system more appropriate? Perhaps this will be addressed. Sorry if this offends but it is an honest reflection.”

Mr Wood was convicted and sentenced to an extended term of nine years (six years’ custody and three years’ extended licence). On appeal, two psychiatrists concluded he had been unfit to plead due to the irreversible brain injury.

The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction but found sufficient evidence that he committed the act (under section 6(1)(b) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968). It then considered the three available disposals: a hospital order (with or without restrictions), a supervision order, or an absolute discharge. As no treatment was available, a hospital order was inappropriate. A supervision order required agreement from either the local authority or the National Probation Service, which was not forthcoming. The court therefore, reluctantly, imposed an absolute discharge.

This case highlights both the risks of inadequate expert evidence in mental health cases and the limited disposal options where a defendant is unfit to plead but found to have committed the act.

Key points
  • Where it is clear that a defendant was found fit to plead in error it is possible that a fresh evidence appeal can be pursued. Further expert evidence will always be required in such cases.
  • When a person who is unfit is found to have committed the act the only available disposals are;
    • hospital order (with or without restrictions),
    • a supervision order,
    • or an absolute discharge.
  • A supervision orders may contain a treatment requirement and /or a residence requirement.
  • A court shall not make a supervision order unless it is satisfied that the supervising officer intended to be specified in the order is willing to undertake the supervision.
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