A public law care case recently concluded in which earlier in proceedings Joseph Lynch represented a privately paying intervenor in the finding of fact hearing. His client faced very serious allegations around sexual abuse of the respondent mother’s (his partner) children; at the conclusion of the finding of fact hearing no findings were made against him or his partner.
In the recent case of Re: E (Children Costs) ( E (Children: Costs), Re – Find Case Law – The National Archives) the Court of Appeal allowed (in part) the Father’s appeal against a ‘no order as to costs’ decision following a fact-finding hearing where ‘extreme allegations’ that ‘completely transformed the proceedings’ were made.
Whilst an important judgment which gives clear and helpful guidance on costs in those circumstances, the considerations in the public law context of this case and the party against whom the costs were being sought distinguish it in my view from Re E.
The intervenor was fully exonerated from the allegations which had been made against him, and the court concluded the boy’s accounts did not satisfy the necessary burden and what had been alleged had not happened.
Upon becoming involved and assessing the case the Local authority advanced two hypothesis and having considered the evidence concluded that it sought the findings against the respondent father, for that reason it can be said that the allegations against the intervenor were driven by the respondent father not the Local Authority. It was playing its role in considering the counter allegations and reached a clear position which was confirmed by the court.
At the conclusion of the finding of fact it was submitted on behalf of the intervenor that he has been put to unnecessary expenditure through the actions of the respondent father, and that the court was seized of two questions when it considers this proposition.
- Does it have the power to make a costs order against a legally aided party?
- If it is satisfied it has the power to make the Costs order, is it proportionate to do so in the circumstances?
The argument was advanced on behalf of the intervenor, that firstly the costs order could be made and secondly it should be made. It was put forward on the following basis.
Powers Of The Court
The starting point for the court in legislation is the Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 with the relevant provision being part 26 which states: Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012
26 Costs in civil proceedings
(1) Costs ordered against an individual in relevant civil proceedings must not exceed the amount (if any) which it is reasonable for the individual to pay having regard to all the circumstances, including—
(a) the financial resources of all of the parties to the proceedings, and
(b) their conduct in connection with the dispute to which the proceedings relate.
(2) In subsection (1) “relevant civil proceedings”, in relation to an individual, means—
(a) proceedings for the purposes of which civil legal services are made available to the individual under this Part, or
(b) if such services are made available to the individual under this Part for the
purposes of only part of proceedings, that part of the proceedings.
(3) Regulations may make provision for exceptions from subsection (1).
(4) In assessing for the purposes of subsection (1) the financial resources of an individual to whom civil legal services are made available, the following must not be taken into account, except so far as prescribed—
(a) the individual’s clothes and household furniture, and
(b) the implements of the individual’s trade.
(5) Subject to subsections (1) to (4), regulations may make provision about costs in
relation to proceedings for the purposes of which civil legal services are made available under this Part.
(6) Regulations under subsection (5) may, in particular, make provision—
(a) specifying the principles to be applied in determining the amount of any costs
which may be awarded against a party to whom civil legal services are made
available under this Part,
(b) limiting the circumstances in which, or the extent to which, an order for costs may be enforced against such a party,
(c) as to the cases in which, and the extent to which, such a party may be required to give security for costs and the manner in which it is to be given,
(d) requiring the payment by the Lord Chancellor of the whole or part of any costs
incurred by a party to whom civil legal services are not made available under this
Part,
(e) specifying the principles to be applied in determining the amount of costs which
may be awarded to a party to whom civil legal services are made available under
this Part,
(f) as to the court, tribunal or other person by whom the amount of any costs is to be determined, and
(g) as to the extent to which any determination of that amount is to be final.
(7) Regulations may provide that an individual is to be treated, for the purposes of
subsection (1) or regulations under subsection (3) or (5), as having or not having financial resources of a prescribed description (but such regulations have effect subject to subsection (4)).
(8) Regulations under subsection (7) may, in particular, provide that the individual is to be treated as having prescribed financial resources of a person of a prescribed description.
(9) Regulations under this section may include provision requiring information and
documents to be provided.
It is clear from the primary legislation that the power exists for the court to make costs orders.
The Court may then wish to consider the Civil Legal Aid (Costs) Regulations 2013 The Civil Legal Aid (Costs) Regulations 2013. Part Two outlines’ costs protection and it was submitted that does not prevent the making of a costs order in the circumstances of this case.
Within Part three of the regulation’s guidance is given to the manner in which costs orders should be made and what considerations should be given. The issue of an order against the Lord Chancellor was not one that was considered. When looking through Part Three the court will have regard for the assessment of resources and the determination of costs, again both sections do not provide any prevention of the costs order being made.
After that it would be sensible to look at Family Procedure Rule 28 (The Family Procedure Rules 2010)and PD28.1 (PRACTICE DIRECTION 28A – COSTS) which confirms the approach to take and does not seek to restrict the powers of the court in public law proceedings. & Civil Procedure Rule 44.3 which provides the outline for factors to consider.
Once the court has gone through consideration of the legislation, regulations and rules it is clear that it does have the power to make a costs order against a legally aided party.
The court could then move onto the second consideration of whether or not it should make such an order in favour of the intervenor. The court was assisted by the decisions which were reached in Re J (Cost of Fact-Finding Hearing) [2010] 1 FLR 1893 and Re T (Children) [2021] UKSC 36 In the matter of T (A Child) (Appellant) – UK Supreme Court
Re J can be considered a starting point when seeking to claim costs following a fact-finding hearing. The case was heard in the context of private law children proceedings, but the reasoning applied by the Court of Appeal follows through to Children Act cases also. The principle applied was that a fact-finding hearing arises by virtue of an individual making allegations. If those allegations had not been made, or in this case pursued by the respondent father, the fact-finding hearing would not have been necessary. Therefore, it is possible to ring-fence the costs of and incidental to such a hearing from the general proceedings where costs are rarely in issue.
In Re T the supreme court helpfully considers the process for the making of costs orders in child care cases, the significant difference in this consideration was that the court was considering an application for costs against a local authority rather than an individual respondent as the intervenor did in this matter. The concluding and relevant conclusion of the case appears at paragraph 44 where it is stated:
‘For these reasons we have concluded that the general practice of not awarding costs against a party, including a local authority, in the absence of reprehensible behaviour or an unreasonable stance, is one that accords with the ends of justice and which should not be subject to an exception in the case of split hearings’.
This brought us to the crux of the issue, had the behaviour of the respondent father been reprehensible and had he adopted an unreasonable stance during the course of the proceedings which had led to the intervenor being brought before the court. Given the court made the following findings:
The children have not been sexually or physically abused by their mother or
the intervenor. The allegations made by the children were as a result of
coaching / coercion by their father or otherwise arose as a result of the
influence by the father; driven by his animus against the mother and his desire
to have exclusive care of the children.
(ii) The father has concealed and lied about his involvement in the development of
the children’s allegations. He has sought to manipulate the children and
professionals in furtherance of his desire to exclude the mother from the
children’s lives and to assume exclusive sole care of the children.
It was submitted that it cannot be said that the respondent father’s behaviour had been anything other than reprehensible, and he had clearly adopted an unreasonable stance throughout the leadup to the finding of fact hearing. By maintaining a lie throughout he required the local authority to include the intervenor in their investigative process and forced him to go through the unnecessary stress of facing allegations the respondent father knew to be false. For those reasons it would be perfectly proper and fair for the court to exercise the power it has in relation to costs and order the respondent father to cover the costs of the intervenor.
Having considered the application the court was satisfied that it was proper and fair to make the costs order against the respondent father in favour of the intervenor.
Whilst the default position in care proceedings will likely remain that costs orders are not sought against an individual, often on the basis of impecuniosity of a legally aided party, it is clear that where the means do exist to reimburse a wrongly accused intervenor the court has the power to do so.

